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The progression and regression of slave morality in Nietzsche's *Genealogy*: The moralization of bad conscience and indebtedness

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Abstract. With the advent of slave morality and the belief system it entails, human beings alone begin to advance to a level beyond that of simple, brute, animal nature. While Christianity and its belief system generate a progression, however, allowing human beings to become interesting for the first time, Nietzsche also maintains in the *Genealogy* that slave morality is a regression, somehow lowering or bringing them down from a possible higher level. In this paper I will argue that this is not a mere inconsistency in Nietzsche's writing, but is instead an important clue to a correct interpretation of the *Genealogy*.

" . . . [I]t was on the soil of this *essentially dangerous* form of human existence, the priestly form, that man first became *an interesting animal . . .*," Nietzsche writes in the "First Essay", Section 6, of the *Genealogy of Morals*.[1] With the advent of slave morality and the belief system it entails, human beings alone begin to advance to a level beyond that of simple, brute, animal nature. While Christianity and its belief system generate a progression, however, allowing human beings to become interesting for the first time, Nietzsche also maintains in the *Genealogy* that slave morality is a regression, somehow lowering or bringing them down from a possible higher level. Some may conclude that these apparently conflicting claims should be explained away as a mere inconsistency: either as a flat contradiction, which Nietzsche may well have been willing to tolerate, or as an inadvertent slip that Nietzsche would rather have amended.

In this essay, I will argue that it is neither a flat contradiction, nor an inadvertent slip, and that there is a better way to understand these passages than attributing a careless inconsistency to Nietzsche. I will begin with a full elaboration of the problem as it appears in the *Genealogy*. Then I will need to discuss the development of the meanings and values of the ascetic priest, especially those of "*ressentiment*" and the "will to truth," as they grow through the revaluation of noble values. Next, I will turn to the "Second Essay" of the *Genealogy* to discuss how the "internalization" of human beings and the revaluation of noble values should have, according to Nietzsche, lead to the death of God and a "second innocence." I will then show how the progression of the "Second Essay" becomes "moralized," and is turned into

a fundamental regression at the hands of the ascetic priests. After exploring these key concepts, by putting them all together and understanding their interaction, I will finally be able to give an explanation as to how slave morality is both a progression and a regression. Lastly, having cleared up this seeming inconsistency, I will briefly discuss the position in which this leaves Nietzsche, and how he proposes to deal with the movement of Christianity.

1. The issue

In the "First Essay" of the *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche maintains that it is because of the power and influence of the ascetic priests that human beings begin their journey away from their animalistic nature. The ascetic priests were engaged in a process of "revaluation" whereby they completely changed what was once considered good, the values of the nobles, into something judged to be evil, and vice versa, changing the bad values of the slaves into those which are praised. In this way, "the Jews, that priestly people, . . . in opposing their enemies and conquerors were ultimately satisfied with noting less than a radical revaluation of their enemies' values, . . . an act of the *most spiritual revenge*" (Sect. 7, pp. 33–34). This attack on the system of values of the noble class was not a simple one, not a temporary external revolt directed against the oppressors of the slaves. Rather, it was a "spiritual revenge," one that took place mainly internally, in the hearts of the slaves, and especially in the minds of the priests who engendered this revenge. Whereas the nobles are constituted and driven by instinct and external discharges of action, the slaves internalized their anger,

> for this alone was appropriate to . . . the people embodying the most deeply repressed priestly vengefulness. It was the Jews who, with awe-inspiring consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value-equation . . . saying "the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good . . . alone are blessed by God . . ." (Sect. 7, p. 34).

The revenge of the priests, moved into the hearts and minds of those who bore the brunt of the nobles' oppression, is a spiritual one, forcing one to turn inside instead of outside for retribution.

Nietzsche claims that it is this spiritualization, this hatred of the impotent turned inward, which makes the human being interesting for the first time. Nietzsche observes that the priestly values, set over and above the values of the noble class, start out as a simple opposition: "the 'pure one' is from the beginning merely a man who washes himself, who forbids himself certain

foods that produce skin ailments . . . no more, hardly more!" (Sect. 6, p. 32). However, "on the other hand, . . . it is clear from the whole nature of an essentially priestly aristocracy why antithetical valuations could in precisely this instance soon become dangerously deepened, sharpened, and internalized" (Sect. 6, p. 32). Thus, what starts with a simple opposition, "merely a man who washes himself," becomes something dangerous and spiritual at the hands of the priest. Hence, Nietzsche writes:

> For with the priests *everything* becomes more dangerous, not only cures and remedies, but also arrogance, revenge, acuteness, profligacy, love, lust to rule, virtue, disease – but it is only fair to add that it was on the soil of this *essentially dangerous* form of human existence, the priestly form, that man first became an *interesting animal*, that only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire *depth* and become *evil* – and these are the two basic respects in which man has hitherto been superior to other beasts! (Sect. 6, pp. 32–33).

With the power and influence of the priestly class, the human being shies away from action and turns hatred inward, becoming not only deeper, but also evil and more dangerous; Nietzsche remarks that, "human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it . . ." (Sect. 7, p. 33).

Nonetheless, as Nietzsche moves slightly away from this discussion of the apparent progression of human beings in order to spell out his genealogy of morals in greater detail, he briefly talks about the regression of human beings. In Section 11, Nietzsche writes:

> Supposing that . . . the *meaning of all culture* is the reduction of the beast of prey "man" to a tame and civilized animal, a *domestic animal*, then one would undoubtedly have to regard all those instincts . . . through whose aid the noble races and their ideals were finally confounded and overthrown as the actual *instruments of culture* . . . Rather is the reverse not merely probable – no! today it is *palpable*! These bearers of the oppressive instincts . . ., the descendants of every kind of European and non-European slavery . . . they represent the *regression* of mankind! (Sect. 11, pp. 42–43).

Those of the priestly class and its descendants, who are too impotent to direct their energy and hatred outward, have said "No" to the values of the nobles (including, as will be discussed later, life itself). Rather than supposing that those who oppose the nobles' values are the embodiment of culture, Nietzsche

maintains that they instead are counterarguments against culture itself. It is wrong for one of these descendants "to feel himself as the goal and zenith, as the meaning of history, as 'higher man,' " for such a descendant is instead a regression of some sort, a "maggot 'man,' " "hopelessly mediocre and insipid" (Sect. 11, p. 43). Culture, Nietzsche maintains, cannot be thought of as embodied in mediocre men, descendants of the slaves infected by the priestly class. Rather, real culture should be manifest in the true "higher man," who stands above the "domestic animal."

On the one hand, the ascetic priest and the movement of Christianity raises human beings above the animals, giving them depth and the possibility for evil. On the other hand, this movement is a regression, the slave mentality relegated to the status of a domestic animal which wrongly considers itself a higher man. What is one to make of this apparent contradiction in Nietzsche's text? In my view, the solution to this problem can be found in the "Second Essay" of the *Genealogy*; but before presenting such a solution, one must first enter into greater detail regarding the nature of this movement of slave morality, of the Christian system of beliefs and its development.

2. *Ressentiment* and the will to truth

How did the ascetic priests engender a spiritual revenge against the nobles, and what has become of this revaluation of the nobles' values? In order to properly answer these questions, and hence to understand the importance of the "Second Essay," it is necessary to first discuss the concepts of *ressentiment* and nihilism which are characteristic of Christian morality. Nietzsche introduces the term *ressentiment* as one of the primary foundations for the morality of the slaves:

> The slave revolt in morality begins when *ressentiment* itself becomes creative and gives birth to values . . . While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what is "different," . . . and *this* No is its creative deed . . . [I]n order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world . . . its action is fundamentally reaction (Sect. 10, pp. 36–37).

Recall that, whereas the nobles were concerned with action and instinct, externalizing any anger they might have, slave morality internalizes its hatred toward the nobles and toward life. As Max Scheler explains in, *Ressentiment*:

> Thirst for revenge is the most important source of *ressentiment*. . . . Revenge is distinguished by two essential characteristics. First of all, the immediate reactive impulse, with the accompanying emotions of anger and rage, is temporarily or at least momentarily checked and restrained . . . This blockage is caused by the reflection that an immediate reaction would lead to defeat, and by a concomitant pronounced feeling of "inability" and "impotence" . . . Furthermore, [secondly] it is of the essence of revenge that it always contains the *consciousness* of "tit for tat," so that it is never a mere emotional reaction.[2]

With the revaluation of the nobles' values, the new values of the ascetic priests are founded in direct reaction to the noble class. Such reaction is not a positive creation of new values, but a mere Nay-saying to whatever was deemed "good" by the higher class. *Ressentiment* is only a tool for the weak, for one who is afraid to act and who represses his/her thirst for revenge, preferring restraint over action.

Among the values which the ascetic priests reactively reject, however, is the value of life itself, and with it the value of anything associated with this world. Whereas the slave morality "always first needs a hostile external world," Nietzsche writes that, "the reverse is the case with the noble mode of valuation: it acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks its opposite only so as to affirm itself more gratefully and triumphantly" (Sect. 10, p. 37). The nobles embrace life and enjoy living it. However, since slave morality is a rejection of noble values, slave morality must (*ipso facto*) also reject this embracing of life. Indeed, so much so that Nietzsche maintains in the "Third Essay" that life itself and even mere existence is translated into suffering for the descendants of the priestly class: " 'what does it *mean* when a philosopher pays homage to the ascetic ideal?' – here we get at any rate a first indication; he wants to *gain release from a torture*" (Sect. 6, p. 106). These descendants, including the vast majority of people in the Western tradition, allegedly equate living with suffering, and want desperately to be relieved of this suffering. The nobles are strong and embrace life, but the impotent are unhappy with their lot, rejecting life and hoping only to be relieved of it; life itself is rejected as having any value. As Nietzsche summarizes, the earth might be characterized as "the distinctively *ascetic planet*, a nook of disgruntled, arrogant, and offensive creatures filled with a profound disgust at themselves, at the earth, at all life . . ." (Sect. 11, p. 117). From Nietzsche's perspective, this Nay-saying to the world and all its associated values, this natural consequence of *ressentiment*, even to the point of rejecting the worth of life itself, is, in a word, nihilism.

The ascetic priest, however, only ensures that the desire to be relieved from suffering and the drive toward nihilism will continue, for "he combats only the suffering itself, the discomfiture of the sufferer, *not* its cause, *not* the real

sickness" (Sect. 17, pp. 129–130). In order to defend against the noble class and to maintain the revaluation of values, the ascetic priest must keep the "herd" from overcoming its suffering. As we will see in greater detail below with the discussion of guilt, the priest needs the herd to continually look to him for an understanding of their suffering, for if they should somehow be able to deal with suffering on their own, the priest would no longer be in power. To stay in power, the priest must walk the narrow line between fending off the nobles' attacks, continually working in reaction to the values of the nobles, and making sure that the herd never overcome their sickness. It is only with the rejection of life that the rejection of the nobles' values will continue and the priest as well as the slaves can maintain power.

Interestingly, however, along with this nihilism comes a whole host of other values which might be summarized as the "will to truth." In order to understand how these additional values would arise with slave morality and nihilism, one must keep in mind what Scheler points out in, *Ressentiment*, namely that, "a 'morality' is a system of preference between the values themselves, a 'moral constitution' which must be discovered *behind* the concrete valuations of a nation and era."[3] In other words, morality is not concerned merely with specific actions that are permissible or forbidden, nor is it particularly concerned with one system of morality, such as Utilitarianism; rather, morality in Nietzsche's sense looks behind the system to establish what preferences are in operation, the value of those preferences, and what work they are doing. In this respect, the will to truth is every bit a part of morality as, say, the prohibition of murder.

The will to truth is a by-product of the reaction against, and negation of, the enjoyment of life and this world. In the "Third Essay," Nietzsche writes, "Suppose such an incarnate will to contradiction and antinaturalness is induced to *philosophize*: upon what will it vent its innermost contrariness? Upon what is felt most certainly to be real and actual: it will look for error precisely where the instinct of life most unconditionally posits truth" (Sect. 12, p. 118). The *ressentiment* of slave morality desires revenge against the members of the noble class and their enjoyment of this life which the slaves identify only as suffering. With the Nay-saying slave morality, appreciation of this world gives way to embracing an other-worldly reality, where one seeks to find alleviation from suffering. This other world is one of Being and stasis, a world of objective truth and of pure reason, a world inhabited by God, and a world where the individual will find eternal peace from the sufferings of the earthly world. Hence, Nietzsche maintains that the will to truth grows out of a Nay-saying to life which moves the priestly descendants towards this other-worldly realm in a quest for Being, stasis, truth, and peace.

Science, then, is not opposed to slave morality; rather it stems from the same root. Many see science and its unquestioning will to truth as a potential rival of Christianity and slave morality, but for Nietzsche this conception is severely mistaken. The will to truth is part of the system of slave morality and is a driving force in the development of science:

> No! Don't come to me with science when I ask for the natural antagonist of the ascetic ideal . . . [I]t might even be said to represent the driving force in the latter's inner development . . . This pair, science and the ascetic ideal, both rest on the same foundation . . . on the same overestimation of truth (more exactly: on the same belief that truth is inestimable and cannot be criticized) (Sect 25, p. 153).

Science, in its will to truth, operates well within the bounds of slave morality, never questioning the possibility and transcendent nature of truth, always maintaining a "faith in a *metaphysical* value, the absolute value of *truth*, sanctioned and guaranteed by this [ascetic] ideal alone (it stands or falls with this ideal)" (Sect 24, p. 151).

It is now possible to move toward the question of progress, by examining the notion of the "death of God." It is Nietzsche's hope that the will to truth will come full circle, that the desire to find permanent and fixed truths will result in the destruction of those very values upon which such a will is founded. This destruction is symbolized by the "death of God," which the madman in *The Gay Science* proclaims to the villagers, but which they cannot yet understand. Walter Kaufmann makes clear the claim that Nietzsche's assertion of the "death of God" is not a metaphysical proposition:

> It seems paradoxical that God, if ever he lived, could have died – and the solution is that Nietzsche's pronouncement does not at all purport to be a dogmatic statement about a supernatural reality: . . . [It] is an attempt at a diagnosis of contemporary civilization, not a metaphysical speculation about ultimate reality.[4]

If the quest for truth, itself based on slave morality's belief in other-worldly values, is allowed to come to completion, Nietzsche expects that it will reveal that there are no such truths, no such other-worldly realms, and no God; there are only perspectives.

While agreeing that the death of God concerns a question of historical meaning and not one of metaphysics, Robin Alice Roth, in her noteworthy article, "Nietzsche's Use of Atheism," points out that the death of God should also not be equated with atheism:

> Instead of arguing favorably for atheism, Nietzsche generally regards atheism as the consequence of the ascetic ideal. Atheism is the result of . . . an atrophy brought on by the over-cultivation and commitment to a moral, logical, and unconditional version of the truth. Such a rigid understanding of the truth is the core of the ascetic ideal, its inner essence . . . Thus, atheism should be distinguished from the death of God.[5]

Atheism, then, is not necessarily the same as the death of God, because while atheism does maintain the nonexistence of God, it also maintains a belief in truth, transcendence, suffering, reason, objectivity, and most other values inherent in the will to truth. While atheism may assert that life has become meaningless without a God to ensure such meaning, it has not yet realized that meanings, truths, and values are to be created and not discovered. Atheism is caught in the will to truth, and is not yet ready to cast away the realm of the transcendent and the tradition of Plato in favor of the freedom and liberation of creation. Nietzsche hopes that there will be a realization that the will to truth, the core of the ascetic ideal, springs from a tradition which says "No" to the values associated with this world and to the values of the nobles, and which equates living with suffering while positing an other-worldly realm of transcendence where peace, stasis, and truth exist to be found. Only a new, more radical and complete revaluation, symbolized by the death of God, will, Nietzsche hopes, allow human beings to overcome the tradition which has lead them to believe in such falsities.

It is this overcoming of the nihilistic tradition by the "death of God" to which Nietzsche appears to be referring in his discussion of guilt and debt in his "Second Essay." He writes:

> The advent of the Christian God, as the maximum god attained so far, was therefore accompanied by the maximum feeling of guilty indebtedness on earth.[6] Presuming we have gradually entered upon the *reverse* course, there is no small probability that with the irresistible decline of faith in the Christian God there is now also a considerable decline in mankind's feeling of guilt; indeed, the prospect cannot be dismissed that the complete and definitive victory of atheism might free mankind of this whole feeling of guilty indebtedness towards its origin, its *causa prima*. Atheism and a kind of *second innocence* belong together (Sect. 20, pp. 90–91).

What has happened to this nearly inevitable change which the death of God would bring? Why does the progression of the will to truth not necessarily lead to an overthrow of the moral tradition? If we are able to answer these

questions, we will also have given an appropriate answer to the problem of the progression and regression of slave morality. Now that we have examined *ressentiment* and the will to truth, we are able to analyze this "Second Essay" in more detail: in order to understand Nietzsche's position, then, it is necessary to elaborate on the concepts of guilt and indebtedness, and to examine the possibility of regression.

3. Bad conscience and guilt

Whereas Nietzsche's discussion and analysis of slave morality comes in the "First" and "Third Essay," if we read closely, the story of the history of slave morality as Nietzsche envisions it actually begins in the "Second Essay." Here, Nietzsche is concerned with the origin and development of " 'Guilt,' 'Bad Conscience,' and the Like." This essay is an attempt to explain how "that uncanny intertwining of the ideas 'guilt and suffering' was first effected" (Sect. 6, p. 65), and to explain the origin and nature of "bad conscience." Nietzsche begins with a discussion of punishment, and he maintains that, originally, punishment was a way for creditors to receive recompense for debts which could not be paid back:

> an equivalence is provided by the creditor's receiving, in place of a literal compensation for an injury (thus in place of money, land, possessions of any kind), a recompense in the form of a kind of *pleasure* – the pleasure of being allowed to vent his power freely upon one who is powerless (Sect. 5, pp. 64–65).

The creditor substitutes the pleasure of cruelty for whatever specific debt is owed to him. Such punishment and cruelty, however, were inflicted with "the clearest conscience in the world" (Sect. 6, p. 66), with the earnest belief that to make suffer was enjoyable: "to what extent can suffering balance debts or guilt[7]? To the extent that to *make* suffer was in the highest degree pleasurable . . ." (Sect. 6. p. 65). To make suffer was a life-affirming and pleasurable action, done with a clear conscience, and was an acceptable substitution for a specific debt that was owed.

Nietzsche wants to make it clear, however, that the effect of punishment was not to make the sufferer feel guilt. Indeed, Nietzsche claims that on most occasions, just the opposite took place: "It is precisely among criminals and convicts that the sting of conscience is extremely rare . . . Generally speaking, punishment makes men hard and cold; it concentrates; it sharpens the feeling of alienation; it strengthens the power of resistance" (Sect. 14,

p. 81). One would be mistaken to think, then, that punishment naturally lead to feelings of guilt in the criminal or debtor. Those who suffered "submitted to punishments as one submits to an illness or to a misfortune or to death, with . . . stout-hearted fatalism without rebellion" (Sect. 15, p. 83). Nor did those who were punishing think otherwise, for they sought only pleasure in another's suffering; "throughout the greater part of human history punishment was *not* imposed *because* one held the wrongdoer responsible for his deed, thus *not* on the presupposition that only the guilty one should be punished" (Sect. 4, p. 63). The thought that one could have done differently, that one had a free will to choose action, does not come until the advent of the ascetic priests, until punishment is intertwined with guilt. Both the punisher and the sufferer participated in the "festival of cruelty" without any thoughts of guilt or responsibility.

When the debtor-creditor relation unfolds on a grand scale and becomes the foundation for society, and when punishment is utilized as a "bulwark" through which political organizations can stay in power, punishment does, however, lead to "internalization." Nietzsche writes:

> All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly *turn inward* – this is what I call the *internalization* of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his "soul." The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was *inhibited* (Sect. 16. p. 84).

Those noble persons, who had a strong "active force" at work in them, were eventually, through violence, able to shape, mold, and create a community and a State. These strong creators, however, had to control this community and to fortify their own position as rulers. Hence, the strong had to impose rules, laws, codes of conduct, and a "morality of mores" to keep the community functioning and to keep themselves in power. Thus a participant in the community could no longer act out however s/he desired. Thus not all forms of behavior and creation were allowed to take place. But because all instincts must go somewhere, Nietzsche maintains that they become internalized. All persons have the instincts which allowed them to survive originally in a lawless and savage state. But no matter how great one's need or desire for action, punishing, or destruction, these instincts were forced inside by the bulwarks of the State, by the move from savagery to community, controlled and orchestrated by the coercion of the strong. The result, Nietzsche claims, is "internalization," the movement from animal instincts to "thinking, inferring, reckoning, coordinating cause and effect, these unfortunate creatures; they

were reduced to their 'consciousness,' . . ." (Sect. 16, p. 84). Internalization seems to be Nietzsche's explanation of the advent of "consciousness," the "inner world," or the "soul."

This leads us to two main points of the "Second Essay." The first is an explanation of how human beings became "conscious," how they developed a "soul." This is a necessary part of the history of the genealogy of morals, for one cannot have a moral nature if there is no consciousness, no "inner world," but instead only immediate animal reflexes. With the advent of an organized society, one's natural propensity towards action and cruelty is turned inward. We must be careful to understand Nietzsche as much as possible here, for though human beings have directed their actions inward, this is not yet the sickness caused by the ascetic priests. This is the breeding of "an animal with the right to make promises" (Sect. 1, p. 57). Nietzsche is quite explicit in the second section that such a change is to be desired, for one who can make promises has " . . . in him a proud consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of *what* has at length been achieved and become flesh in him, a consciousness of his own power and freedom, a sensation of mankind come to completion" (Sect. 2, p. 59). There is a pleasure, Nietzsche says, in turning punishment and cruelty inward, "this secret self-ravishment, this artists' cruelty, this delight in imposing a form upon oneself as a hard, recalcitrant, suffering material . . ." (Sect. 18, p. 87).

Relatedly, then, Nietzsche's second point is to argue, as discussed above, that punishment originally had nothing to do with "guilt." In order to see this point, and its subsequent importance, it is necessary to focus on the way in which Nietzsche uses the term "bad conscience."[8] If read carefully, it is clear that Nietzsche consistently uses two different senses of this term, and designates this by writing them differently. The first is written " 'bad conscience' " (with quotations), and signifies "the *feeling of guilt in the guilty person*" or the " 'sting of conscience' " (Sect. 14, p. 81). The second sense is "bad conscience" (without quotations), and signifies *mere internalization*.[9] The first sense is always tied up with the sting of conscience, *ressentiment*, and a feeling of guilt. Nietzsche is concerned with discovering how the purely pleasurable nature of punishment became intertwined with " 'bad conscience.' " But the answer to this question involves the second sense of "bad conscience." "Bad conscience" in this sense is the internalization of human beings, the development of the "soul" and the "inner world," without which " 'bad conscience' " would never have been able to take place. Nietzsche will later conclude that " 'bad conscience' " is parasitic on "bad conscience."[10]

In this respect, I am able to make a crucial point about Nietzsche's "Second Essay," and able to synthesize the points of the preceding paragraphs. If we have read Nietzsche correctly up to this point in the "Essay," one can talk

about "bad conscience," "internalization," "punishment," and "indebtedness," without discussing " 'bad conscience,' " "guilt," or any of the other values of slave morality. Nietzsche is presenting the history of the genealogy of morals, and this history begins with the development of consciousness itself through internalization or, what is the same thing, bad conscience.[11] This history can be related without the mention of guilt or "bad conscience." The intertwining of punishment and bad conscience with guilt and "bad conscience" remains to be explained later. Thus Nietzsche writes:

> I regard the bad conscience as the serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress of the most fundamental change he ever experienced – that change which occurred when he found himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and of peace . . . I believe there has never been such a feeling of misery on earth, such a leaden discomfort – and at the same time the old instincts had not suddenly ceased to make their usual demands! Only it was hardly or rarely possible to humor them (Sect. 16, p. 84).

Bad conscience here seems to be a simple internalization, as was described above, with the needs and desires for cruelty, action, and destruction turned inward. Certainly this is a type of illness or sickness: the mere fact that one is unable to act out as one's passions decree is itself a type of illness, especially when compared to noble persons, those models of health, who are able to act powerfully whenever so desired.[12] But this illness is not yet affiliated or intertwined with guilt; " . . . this instinct for freedom pushed back and repressed, incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself: that, and that alone, is what the *bad conscience* is in its beginnings" (Sect. 17, p. 87). This new conscience is indeed a "bad" conscience, but here it seems that Nietzsche is concerned with bad conscience only as an internalization. This is a type of sickness, for one is not able to act at will, but it is not yet the truly "bad conscience" it will become at the hands of the ascetic priest.[13] The noble people are still characterized by action, power, beauty, and happiness. It is simply that they are not now necessarily able to exercise such power at any time, and may find a new enjoyment at turning their cruelty towards themselves. But this is not the same as *ressentiment*, not an impotent person who cannot act in any fashion, who checks his/her action primarily because s/he fears defeat, who is sick of suffering, and who can only react to a "hostile external world."[14]

Thus, in Section 20, Nietzsche writes: "I have up to now deliberately ignored the moralization of these concepts (their pushing back into the conscience; more precisely, the involvement of the *bad* conscience with the concept of

god)" (Sect. 21, p. 91). If one looks back to the previous 19 sections of this "Second Essay," one does indeed see that Nietzsche has explained the development of bad conscience, of internalization, without speaking of the "moralization" of this new conscience. He has given an account of internalization which does not depend on feelings of guilt, making sure the reader understands punishment as something which is life-affirming and done with a clear conscience. Perhaps this is clearest at the end of Section 18 (p. 88), where Nietzsche is interested to "make less enigmatic the enigma of how contradictory concepts such as *selflessness, self-denial, self-sacrifice* can suggest an ideal, a kind of beauty." These might sound like concepts of slave morality, but Nietzsche's point is to show that originally, before the emergence of "bad conscience" and guilt, these concepts could be enjoyed, for there is a "*delight* that the selfless man, the self-denier, the self-sacrificer feels from the first: this delight is tied to cruelty." Hence he concludes: "So much for the present about the origin or the moral value of the 'unegoistic,' about the soil from which this value grew: only the bad conscience, only the will to self-maltreatment provided the conditions for the *value* of the unegoistic." This seems to indicate that, originally, "self-denial" is not the same as "unegoistic," for the first has to do with the pleasure of punishment turned inward, while the later has to do with *ressentiment* and nihilism: bad conscience is the soil upon which slave morality could grow.[15] This is an important point, for it indicates that it was not slave morality which checked action and turned human beings inward for the first time, but it was slave morality that changed the meaning and value of this internalization. Thus, slave morality becomes parasitic upon internalization. *Internalization and bad conscience are not the same as* ressentiment *or slave morality*. It is *only* when human beings reject suffering of any kind and embrace nihilism that bad conscience becomes "bad conscience," and suffering is intertwined with guilt; how this was accomplished, we have not yet discussed.

This concept of the self-punishing, self-denying man brings up a problem, however, of how to comprehend what Nietzsche means in the "First Essay" by human beings being "interesting for the first time." Is the evolution of consciousness and an animal which enjoys self-punishment not an *interesting* development? Nietzsche does not seem to address this question directly. In some respects, it certainly seems like this would be an interesting development, and perhaps Nietzsche would agree to some extent. Perhaps, however, Nietzsche's position is that this new reliance on "consciousness" over animal instincts would not necessarily make human beings interesting unless they discovered something interesting to *do* with this ability. In fact, there remains the possibility that "consciousness" could have made persons less interesting because they would no longer be acting out in an aggressive and powerful

way, due to their emergence in an increasingly stable community. Consciousness might slow human beings down and make their history a much less interesting thing to observe; as Nietzsche maintained, "human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it . . ." (Sect 7, p. 33). It is only with the spirit which the ascetic priests introduced into human consciousness that human beings became evil, and thus interesting for Nietzsche. Indeed, what would human history look like without the creation of the will to truth?

Even in the introduction of the term "interesting" Nietzsche writes that "only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire *depth* and become *evil*." This indicates not only that there already existed a "soul" which could become deeper and evil, but also that it acquired depth in a "higher" sense, indicating that it must have already acquired some type of depth, presumably because it is conscious in the first place. The powerful made humans conscious, and the weak made them interesting: "It is not in *them* [nobles] that the 'bad conscience' developed, that goes without saying – but it would not have developed *without them*, this ugly growth, it would be lacking if a tremendous quantity of freedom had not been expelled from the world, or at least from the visible world . . ." (Sect. 18, p. 87).[16] Mere consciousness is a development which is full of promise, but only if it can be capitalized on; otherwise it may simply lead to the feeling of leaden discomfort and the suspension of action, neither of which make for a particularly interesting account of human history. It is the spirit of *ressentiment* introduced by the impotent which makes human history interesting, but this would not have occurred without a society instituted by the powerful.

The question remains, however, as to how this revaluation was accomplished, and this will be examined in the following section of this paper. We will be able to answer the questions of how it was that "bad conscience" became parasitic of bad conscience, how punishment became intertwined with guilt, why the will to truth does not lead to a second innocence, and why slave morality is both a progression and a regression, all by understanding what Nietzsche means by the "moralization of these concepts."

4. The moralization of "*Schuld*" and "bad conscience"

In Sections 19 through 23 of the "Second Essay," Nietzsche describes how the feeling of indebtedness which one would have towards the spirits of one's tribal ancestors would increase with the success of the tribe and would become so acute as to culminate in the transformation of the ancestors into gods. To begin with, Nietzsche claims that "within the original tribal community – we are speaking of primeval times – the living generation always recognized

a juridical duty toward earlier generations" (Sect. 19, p. 88). Here one sees the debtor-creditor relation once again, with those among the living feeling indebted to those who have come before them and made their lives and their living conditions possible: "The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe *exists* – and that one has to *pay them back* with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a *debt* that constantly grows greater . . ." (Sect. 19, pp. 88–89). Nietzsche claims that, in fact, the more successful a living tribe or community becomes, the more they feel indebted to past generations and the more and increasingly extravagant sacrifices they feel they have to make. As one continues to compare oneself to one's *causa prima* as one increases in power, there comes a point where the amount of indebtedness and the magnitude of necessary sacrifices becomes so great that those "spirits" to whom one felt indebted are necessarily transformed into gods, and, as glimpsed above in the beginning of Section 20, eventually into the Christian God.

This accumulation of debt and the transformation of ancestors into a "creditor" God sets the stage for the "uncanny intertwining of 'guilt and suffering.' " Returning to the larger issues mentioned at the close of the section above, the question becomes: How is the revaluation of the nobles' values accomplished? Why, with the historical development of atheism and the will to truth, is this feeling of indebtedness not overcome once that to which one is indebted is renounced? Why does atheism not lead to a "second innocence?" At the beginning of Section 21, after presenting the debtor-creditor relationship, Nietzsche writes:

> I have up to now deliberately ignored the moralization of these concepts[17] . . .; and at the end of the last section I even spoke as if this moralization had not taken place at all, and as if these concepts were now necessarily doomed since their presupposition, the faith in our "creditor," in God, had disappeared. The reality is, to a fearful degree, otherwise (Sect. 21, p. 91).

Here, Nietzsche seems to be making that claim that, if bad conscience (internalization) and indebtedness were kept pure, that is to say, uninfluenced and uncontaminated by the values of the ascetic ideal, then the movement of atheism and the death of God would finally put an end to any feelings of indebtedness. Punishment did not have to be intertwined with guilt and responsibility. Bad conscience, though an illness, was an illness which could have lead to the masterful animal with the right to make promises, and indebtedness without guilt would have perished with the disbelief in the creditor-god. However, as will be further discussed below, the meanings and values of these concepts

get caught up the meanings and values of slave morality, and it is the "moralization of these concepts" which keeps atheism from culminating in a second innocence by locking it within unquestioning belief in the will to truth.[18]

The concepts of suffering, indebtedness, and bad conscience become moralized and become part of the larger framework of slave morality. It is necessary here to quote Nietzsche at length, and then to comment on his analysis in the following paragraphs:

> The moralization of the concepts guilt and duty, their being pushed back into the *bad* conscience, actually involves an attempt to *reverse* the direction of the development described above, or at least to bring it to a halt: the *aim* now is to preclude pessimistically, once and for all, the prospect of a final discharge; . . . the *aim* now is to turn back the concepts "guilt" and "duty" – back against whom? There can be no doubt: against the "debtor" first of all, in whom from now on the bad conscience is firmly rooted . . . until at last the irredeemable debt gives rise to the conception of irredeemable penance . . . Finally, however, they are turned back against the "creditor," too: . . . suddenly we stand before . . . that stroke of genius on the part of Christianity: God himself sacrifices himself for the guilt of mankind, God himself makes payment to himself, God as the only being who can redeem man from what has become unredeemable for man himself . . . (Sect. 21, pp. 91–92).

In this important paragraph, Nietzsche points out the crucial turn in contractual relations, namely that the moralization of these relations turns the debt back onto the debtor himself without the possibility of repaying the debt. The development of atheism, discussed in Sections 20 and 21, should have come to a point where the disbelief in God alleviated one from any sort of debt. But with the moralization of debt, the ascetic priests have reversed, or at least stopped this movement; by capturing atheism within the will to truth, atheism never results in the death of God, and thus never breaks free from the will to truth or from nihilism. If the ascetic priests are to remain in power and to succeed in their revaluation of the noble values, then it is necessary that the will to truth not come to its full fruition with the death of God. The movement of atheism and the will to truth is halted by securing an eternal feeling of guilt, by eliminating the possibility of ever repaying the debt of one's existence, and thereby ensuring that one will always direct one's anger and need for revenge towards oneself, punishing oneself for one's guilt.

An important aspect of this inability to pay back one's debt is that one subsequently needs a new explanation for one's suffering. Recall that suffering was originally a means for repaying a debt, either to a human or spiritual

creditor. But what happens when the creditor is removed from the scenario and unwilling to accept any further payment? Suffering then becomes meaningless because it can no longer be understood as a way of paying back debt. Nietzsche maintains that human beings are not willing to accept that their individual suffering is meaningless, and need some way to explain it. As Arthur C. Danto writes in his insightful article, "Some Remarks on *The Genealogy of Morals*,"

> sufferers tend to *moralize* suffering by holding someone or something responsible for it: as though mere suffering, undeserved only in the sense that it makes no sense to speak of it as deserved, is simply unintelligible . . . – as though there were no unearned suffering, as it were, as though suffering were in every instance a *sentence* of some sort.[19]

This is where the ascetic priest as the sickly doctor is able to step in and provide what Nietzsche terms "anesthesia" for a wound which he himself has created;

> "I suffer: someone must be to blame for it" – thus thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, tells him: "Quite so my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it – *you alone are to blame for yourself*!" – This is brazen and false enough ("Third Essay" Sect. 15, p. 128).

Consequently, by taking suffering out of the debtor-creditor relationship, the ascetic priest ensures that he will always be in power, always be needed, because it is he who provides an explanation for suffering, he who is able to prescribe meaning for an illness which he himself perpetuates. Thus, suffering, punishment, debt, bad conscience, and other such concepts, while originally uncontaminated, become caught up and understood primarily in terms of values of slave morality.[20]

If contractual relations had remained unaffected by moralization, the will to truth and the "irresistible decline of faith in the Christian God" would naturally lead to a final rejection of man's debt. But the moralization of the debt makes repayment impossible. Hence guilt becomes ingrained in the human psyche. By putting God in the realm of the transcendent absolute, and by placing Him within an entire system of "moral" beliefs, the eternal and creditor God, at the hands of the ascetic priests, is unwilling or unable to accept repayment for debts, and allows the feeling of guilt to remain internalized forever.[21] Thus, the slave revolt remains victorious and there is a continued rejection of all things natural, fluctuating, life-affirming, this-worldly, temporary, and

human. It is no mere coincidence that the persons responsible for such a revaluation of the nobles' values are *priests*.

5. A final interpretation

Hence, it should now be clear how one might give an initial explanation as to how the movement of Christianity and slave morality represents both a progression and a regression. The internalization of hatred, thirst for revenge, guilt, in short, *ressentiment*, allows for human beings to become more interesting, deeper, and more evil than the original animal instincts allow. The sickness, however, the *ressentiment* and guilt which is only treated superficially by the priests so that it may continue eternally, is both a progression from the uninteresting animal instincts, and a regression because it keeps human beings from moving beyond the position of debtor, beyond the weariness of suffering. *The moralization of contractual relations thus puts a halt to what would be the natural culmination of the will to truth with the death of God*. At the hands of the ascetic priests this sickness makes human beings interesting by turning their *ressentiment* inward; indeed, it is only with the priests that the will to truth is first possible. Once bad conscience is moralized into "bad conscience" through the ascetic priest, however, the sickness intensifies and is transformed: this moralization keeps one from throwing off the shackles of slave morality so that one might overcome the guilty, debtor position. This is a sickness which Nietzsche hopes can be cast off so that a new revaluation of values might occur. He hopes for the emergence of a "Caesar with the soul of Christ," a being who would overcome the nihilism inherent in Christianity while retaining the qualities of depth and evil which allowed humankind to become interesting in the first place.

It is important to keep in mind that, for Nietzsche, the meaning or value of something becomes much more important than the thing itself or its original use. As he says in the "Second Essay,"

> the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart . . . [A]ll subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily obscured or even obliterated (Sect. 12, p. 77).

What this indicates is that valuation *per se* is never fixed for all time; value can always be revalued. What is the nature of punishment? What is the value of the ascetic ideal? The answer depends on whose point of view we consider,

and who has influence over who. The "First Essay" questions the meaning and value of good and evil, the "Second Essay" of punishment and suffering, and "Third Essay" of the ascetic ideal itself. These values have undergone revaluation, and can be revalued again. And what this, in turn, indicates is that what is currently a regression could be viewed in the future as a progression, depending on what kind of persons exist and what kind of influence they have.

Nietzsche presents a story of the history of the genealogy of morals that ends in a stagnant sickness, a regression. But suppose that human beings finally break free of this sickness, that there finally emerges Nietzsche's "Caesar with the soul of Christ." Now what meaning will we assign to bad conscience? Now what will be the value of the ascetic ideal? The question then is not what does internalization do, but what is its value? And the same for *ressentiment* and the will to truth. This is the important lesson from the *Genealogy*, and one which allows an even more interesting interpretation of "progression" and "regression." In this respect, it is possible that the people of the future will engender a new revaluation of all values, and view what is now a "regression" as only a "progression." How is this possible? Because it is precisely the "moralization" of debt, internalization, and of the will to truth that keeps one from overcoming what would otherwise have been a temporary illness. In other words, if the internalization of the human being, the debtor-creditor relationship, the nature of punishment, and the desire to ascertain truth[22] were isolated, not placed into the context of slave morality, then from the position of noble existence, one could well have conceived of one's movement towards depth and evil as only a temporary regression, as an illness which would eventually be overcome and make one stronger for the experience.

Originally, one might even have been disposed to view internalization, the movement away from noble existence, as purely progressive, perhaps viewing the decrease in instinctual activity as a temporary inconvenience, a transitory by-product of a process which would inevitably lead to a desirable position, namely the proud "man with the right to make promises." Likewise, a will to truth that finally leads to the death of God may be seen as a progression, an illness which has been overcome, and which has made people stronger. Here, then, one may see why it is necessary to talk of the *moralization* of this process, of the death of the creditor-god, because it is this situating of such concepts permanently within the system of slave morality which changes the meaning of the process and which may forever keep persons from achieving the true benefits from the otherwise natural progression to "second innocence." This seems to be what Nietzsche is inferring, not only with his discussion of domestication and the bearers of culture, but more importantly with his discussion in Section 21 of the "Second Essay" where

he indicates that without the moralization of the concepts of guilt and duty, the process of internalization would come to a proper close with the death of God, and the interpretation and connotation of this process would have remained a beneficial and progressive one. It is a question of meaning, value, and perspective.

6. Nietzsche's gamble

Hence, it is Nietzsche's hope that the movement of a radical atheism and will to truth will finally come full circle to undermine the claims of the system of slave morality. Nietzsche explains at the end of the "Third Essay:" "All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming . . . In this way Christianity *as a dogma* was destroyed by its own morality; in the same way Christianity *as morality* must now perish too" (Sect. 27, p. 161). If the will to truth is allowed to run its course, Nietzsche hopes that it will overcome itself and allow for a new revaluation of values. As he points out, however, this overcoming must be a radical atheism, for, as discussed above, an atheism that is wedded to science is founded on the same bedrock as Christian morality;

> Unconditional honest atheism . . . is therefore *not* the antithesis of that ideal [the will to truth] . . .; it is rather only one of the latest phases of its evolution . . . it is the awe-inspiring *catastrophe* of two thousand years of training in truthfulness that finally forbids itself the *lie involved in belief in God* ("Third Essay," Sect. 27. p. 160).

Because this "unconditional honest atheism" is unwilling or unable to challenge the system of beliefs upon which both it and slave morality are founded, it will take a new and more radical atheism to bring about the overthrow of the ascetic tradition. This is an atheism that would be willing to question the nature of truth itself, to reject its faith in truth, and to overturn the faith in all the "other-worldly" concepts of the Christian tradition.

We turn to, then, what might be termed, "Nietzsche's gamble." James F. Pontuso and Mark J. Rozell state Nietzsche's position concisely as: "Zarathustra must take simple faith and reliance on virtue away from people in order that they might become more than they are. Nietzsche games that from the ruins of civilization the higher men will emerge."[23] In other words, Nietzsche can only hope that by accelerating the movement of atheism and nihilism, when human beings come to the conclusion that there are no truths and no objective values, they will finally overcome the Christian tradition and begin

a new revaluation of the values of slave morality. As Stanley Rosen says in, "Nietzsche's Revolution:"

> Nietzsche plans to "dam up" (his expression) the decay of his time in such a way as to accelerate the instant of destruction. To expand [on] only one aspect of the total situation, immorality is on the one hand a result of relativism brought on by scientific progress and historical sophistication; on the other hand, it is the detachment from decadent values that is the necessary precondition for their destruction and the production of new values.[24]

Nietzsche's gamble is to bet that by accelerating the movements of atheism, nihilism, and the will to truth, in light of the discovery that there are no transcendent truths or other-worldly realms, the system of slave morality will be overcome and something better, a new revaluation, will occur, and human beings can once again progress to a new level. But this is only a gamble, for it is possible that the ascetic priests have done their job only too well, and that with the death of God will come a complete nihilism, a total Nay-saying to this world which will not be overcome. Nietzsche is betting on the overman and not the last man.

Perhaps it is now also possible to see why Nietzsche, at least, may believe such a gamble to be the only possible escape from this entrenchment of the values of slave morality. If Nietzsche's analysis is correct, then what may be needed is not necessarily a new process, but rather a revaluation. In other words, what is needed is not somehow to engender a new philosophical system in order to get "outside" of the nihilism and the will to truth and attack them, for this seems an impossible task, but rather to try to *use* the will to truth itself and push it to its ultimate conclusion with the death of God. Again, it is less a question of beliefs and concepts than it is a question of the meaning and value of them. This is part of what is hinted at but not quite brought to the fore in Rosen's discussion of Nietzsche, namely that the damming up and accelerating of nihilism and the will to truth does not have to result in a new program for Nietzsche's philosophy,[25] but rather will hopefully end in a revaluation alone, much in the same way that the slaves engaged in a scheme of revaluation of the nobles' values to begin with.

Thus, to some extent, nihilism is a double edged sword, depending on how it is conceived. And it is this conception which may be changed with the symbolic death of God. If the will to truth can be pulled from the web of slave morality and all its connotations and values, then it may be possible to conceive of the process as progressive, perhaps along the lines mentioned above of a temporary but necessary change in the nature of noble existence.

This would require the revaluation of the meanings of the ascetic ideal, the removal and reinterpretation of the debtor-creditor relationship and the will to truth as they were found in the structure of slave morality. But, as Nietzsche asks in Section 26 of the last essay of the *Genealogy*, "Who has the courage for it?"

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Notes

1. All quotations from the *Genealogy of Morals* come from Walter Kaufmann's 1967 translation (New York: Random House, Inc., Vintage Books Edition 1989).
2. Max Scheler, *Ressentiment*, ed. A Lewis, trans. William W. Holdheim, (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 46.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
4. Walter Kaufmann, "The Death of God and the Revaluation," in *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Robert Solomon (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 12–13.
5. Robin Alice Roth, "Nietzsche's Use of Atheism," in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 31/1, p. 55.
6. The theme of guilt will be discussed at greater length in the following section of this paper.
7. Kaufmann translates "*Schulden*" here as "debts or guilt." A more appropriate translation may simply be "debts."
8. "*Schlechtes Gewissen*."
9. This is an extremely important point, and one I think which is born out at least in the "Second Essay." Compare Sect. 4, p. 62; Sect. 11, p. 75; Sect. 14, pp. 81–82; Sect. 16, pp. 84–85; Sect. 18, p. 87; Sect. 23, p. 93; and Sect. 24, p. 95, with Sect. 16, p. 84; Sect. 17, pp. 86–87; Sect. 18, pp. 87–88; Sect. 19, p. 88; and Sect. 21, p. 91.
10. Though we must wait until the next section of this paper to see how this is done.
11. For the rest of the paper, I will follow Nietzsche's example, and designate the first meaning of *schlechtes Gewissen* as "bad conscience" (with single quotation marks) and the second meaning as bad conscience (without any quotation marks).
12. In addition to Nietzsche's equation of bad conscience as an illness in Section 16, in Section 19 he also writes: "The bad conscience is an illness, there is no doubt about that, but an illness as pregnancy is an illness" (p. 88). I think it is clear from Nietzsche's discussion in Section 10 of the "First Essay" that "happiness should not be sundered from action – being active was . . . necessarily a part of happiness" (p. 38). Hence any move away from immediate reaction must be a type of illness, though the value of this illness is still undecided.
13. Thus, as an aside, I think that Walter Kaufmann has translated "*Schuld*" wrongly in Section 8 as "guilt" when it seems that "debt" or "indebtedness" fits better with the context, and again in Section 21. Also his translation of "*Das Schuldgefühl*" in Section 20 as, "guilty feeling of indebtedness," may be misleading.
14. An interesting example of this may be Nietzsche's discussion of "law" as opposed to "justice," for law may be taken as one way in which the strong may still control the weak even though the strong are not able to act immediately in any way they choose: "Law

represents on earth . . . the struggle against the reactive feelings, the war conducted against them on the part of the active and aggressive powers who employed some of their strength to impose measure and bounds upon the excesses of the reactive pathos . . .” (Sect. 11, p. 75).

15. Given this conclusion, we must read “Section 16” very carefully, so as not to confuse the two meanings of bad conscience. I take him to be indicating that the “origin of ‘bad conscience’ ” must be, originally, internalization or bad conscience, for otherwise there would be no psychical place for slave morality. Thus he writes that the animal “who had to turn himself into an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and dangerous wilderness – this fool, this yearning and desperate prisoner became the inventor of the ‘bad conscience.’ ” I take this to mean that it was the already internalized human being which could then invent “bad conscience,” and thus “began the gravest and uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet recovered, man’s suffering *of man, of himself* . . .” Self-torture and selflessness are illnesses, but are not themselves the sickness of many wishing to be rid of all suffering, the nihilism of the priests. Particularly telling may be Nietzsche’s calling internalization of bad conscious, “*active* ‘bad conscience’ ” (Sect. 18, p. 87).
16. Also, concerning internalization or bad conscience, Nietzsche writes: “the change referred to was . . . a break, a leap, a compulsion, an ineluctable disaster which precluded all struggle and even all *ressentiment*” (Sect. 17, p. 86).
17. Specifically, “debt” and “duty.”
18. Perhaps, then, Nietzsche’s title of the “Second Essay” is instructive. “ ‘Guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscience,’ and the Like” could be a play on words. “*Schuld*,” for instance, can be translated simply as debt, or as guilt. “*Schlechtes Gewissen*” can be a “bad conscience” of internalization, a will which is not able to act externally whenever it wants, or a “ ‘bad conscience’ ” which has the sting of guilt and responsibility. “ . . . and the Like” may refer to additional terms like punishment or suffering, which originally have guilt-free connotations, but have come to be associated with guilt and responsibility.
19. Arthur C. Danto, “Some Remarks on *The Genealogy of Morals*,” in *Reading Nietzsche*, eds. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 23.
20. This seems to be what Nietzsche has in mind at least in part when, in the “Second Essay,” he writes: “the concept ‘punishment’ [today] possesses in fact not one meaning but a whole synthesis of ‘meanings:’ the previous history of punishment in general, the history of its employment for the most various purposes, finally crystallizes into a kind of unity that is hard to disentangle, hard to analyze and, as must be emphasized especially, totally *indefinable*” (Sect. 13). “Punishment” like the concepts of “guilt” and “bad conscience” become caught in a web of meanings and values posited by slave morality. There is a “synthesis of ‘meanings’ ” with all of these terms because they receive their meaning only by being located in the entire meaning-nexus of slave morality, only by being related to one another in particular ways.
21. The herd instinct finally “attained such dominion that moral evaluation was actually stuck and halted at this antithesis (as, for example, is the case in contemporary Europe: the prejudice that takes ‘moral,’ ‘unegoistic,’ . . . as concepts of equivalent value already rules today with the force of a ‘fixed idea’ and a brain-sickness)” (I, Sect. 2, p. 26).
22. This would not be the “moralized” will to truth, but a will to find truth at any cost, particularly at the cost of the loss of truth itself and the “other-worldly” values.
23. James F. Pontuso and Mark J. Rozell, “Civic Virtue and the Gods: Plato’s *Apology of Socrates* and Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*,” in *Modern Age*, 31 (1987), p. 257.
24. Stanley Rosen, “Nietzsche’s Revolution,” in *The Ancients and the Moderns* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 195.
25. Taken in the broadest sense of the term.